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abstract 
welcoMe to SourceWatch—your guide to the names behind the 
news. SourceWatch is a collaborative project of the Center for Me-
dia and Democracy to produce a directory of the people, organiza-
tions and issues shaping the public agenda. A primary purpose of 
SourceWatch is documenting the PR and propaganda activities of 
public relations firms and public relations professionals engaged in 
managing and manipulating public perception, opinion and policy. 
SourceWatch also includes profiles on think tanks, industry-funded 
organizations and industry-friendly experts that work to influence 
public opinion and public policy on behalf of corporations, gov-
ernments and special interests. 
—SourceWatch website (hyperlinks removed) 
i qualify, evidently, as an “industry-friendly expert” who works 
to influence policy and opinion on behalf of corporations and special interests. 
The SourceWatch entry on me runs to more than 1100 words. It reports that I 
have “a long term relationship with Phillip Morris,” which isn’t true. It lists many 
of my writings on smoking policies and my acknowledgements to the tobacco 
industry for financial support. It also notes that I was a member of the Academic 
Advisory Board of  a “pro-tobacco junk science report.” 
After working at US Treasury in Washington, DC, I came in 1988 to San 
Luis Obispo, California, to become an economics professor at Cal Poly. I still live 
1 Professor of  Economics, California Polytechnic State University. San Luis Obispo, CA 93407. 
I wish to thank Barrie Craven, David Henderson, Alden Shiers, William Orzechowski and three anony-
mous referees for many helpful comments. 
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in San Luis Obispo. Among its many charms, San Luis Obispo is noted for the 
fact, highlighted by its Wikipedia entry, that “The city also banned indoor smok-
ing in all public locations, including bars and restaurants, in 1990, making it the 
first city in the world to do so.” Despite this much lauded achievement and my 
longstanding interest in public economics, I had never given our smoking ban 
much thought prior to its launching. Prior to the ban, there were a few times that 
my wife and I had left some local restaurants prior to ordering because the smoke 
levels were unpleasant to us. But these restaurants were exceptions and mostly 
catered to tourists, and we never had any difficulty finding restaurants that had 
voluntarily forbid smoking, or had accommodated smokers and non-smokers by 
way of smoking/non-smoking sections, outdoor smoking patios, or other means 
that met our preferences. My only observation about the ban’s introduction was 
that it didn’t appear particularly contentious in a college town that appeared to 
have few smokers and conformed to the “California is different” perception that 
those of  us originally from the East-Coast can’t help but experience. 
I am probably more tolerant of behaviors I don’t follow than those who 
believe that it is critical for government to actively address personal behaviors. 
Deep-seated judgments regarding what matters as well as which ideas to pursue in 
research are important for readers to understand. My ideological sensibilities are 
in the direction of believing that private or free markets tend to allocate resources 
pretty well, and that pro-interventionists tend to not understand very well how 
private markets operate. I see pervasive paternalism, a hastiness to find fault with 
private markets and a tendency to romanticize government intervention. In short, 
my ideological sensibilities run along the lines of “public choice” analysis, with a 
strong dose of Milton Friedman’s advocacy of empirical testing of competing hy-
potheses. My interest in public choice analysis is not surprising, given my graduate 
training at Virginia Tech when it housed the Public Choice Center. My fascination 
with empirical work stems from my view that the essential public-policy question 
is always: Since both private markets and governments fail to allocate resources perfectly, which 
does a better job?
My involvement in our local smoking ban issue came about when my fellow 
Cal Poly economist and Business School Dean Bill Boyes was contacted by a local 
group to propose an economic study of the ban under a public health grant made 
possible through state taxes on smokers. Bill thought this would be a good local 
public-relations project for our school and suggested we work together because 
he thought this policy issue was “right up my alley.” At first, I was not particularly 
interested in pursuing a cost-benefit study of the smoking ban because I was writ-
ing a public finance textbook and didn’t need the distraction. I also was hesitant 
about getting involved in what could become a contentious issue within our fish-
bowl town of about 40,000 people, and within the campus community. My first 
suspicion was that many locals were unlikely to be appreciative of any costs we 
uncovered since the local newspaper and public health groups were gushing about 
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Michael l. Marlow 
how progressive they were in pushing for the ban. Prior experience had taught 
me that individuals who push for government expansion rarely enjoy learning of 
attendant costs. 
But I was just finishing a chapter on externalities in my public finance text-
book which included a long section on Ronald Coase’s (1960) article on social costs. 
I devoted five pages to the so-called Coase theorem. One of the vivid memories 
of my graduate student days at Virginia Tech during 1975-78 was reading Coase’s 
paper during my first course in microeconomics taught by Robert Staff. Though I 
struggled with this paper, I came away with the understanding that the Coase the-
orem demonstrated that under certain circumstances private markets are reason-
ably capable of dealing with externalities and therefore provided a cautionary tale 
for the many economists who Coase apparently believed were too quick to jump 
to government intervention. At the time, I did not understand what all the fuss 
was about, why we were required to read Coase or who all these economists were 
who were so tempted to expand government’s role in our economy. Over the years, 
I remained intrigued with Coase’s focus on transaction costs, especially as I began 
to ponder why so many people I met were so enthusiastic for expanding govern-
ment, which certainly carries its own transaction costs. My first 10 working years 
were spent in Washington, DC, first at George Washington University and then 
the US Treasury, and I learned that eager interventionists really are pervasive. 
Coase highlighted the “reciprocal nature of externalities.” The insight helps 
us to understand that affected parties may find diverse ways of coming to agree-
ment. Now, we all understand that Coase’s lesson was as much to highlight the 
need to assess comparative failure as to posit low transaction costs, but the issue 
into which Boyes was enticing me was, in fact, one enclosed within a well-defined 
sphere of private ownership. Transaction costs are low in the important sense that 
you can easily avoid a smoky experience by not going to the restaurant. Owners 
recognize your power to exit, and hence consider your interest in how the experi-
ence at their restaurants should be managed. 
Thus, Coase’s insights were “front and center” in the proposal that Bill Boyes 
and I presented to the grants committee in San Luis Obispo. We began with simple 
questions: How did owners of businesses deal with the issue of smoking prior to the ban? Do 
owners manage their resources to enhance the long-term values of their businesses? Undoubtedly, 
owners understand that smoking is unhealthy, since that has been public knowledge 
since at least the 1964 Surgeon General's Report on Smoking and Health. Owners 
also understand that many non-smokers find the smoke unpleasant. 
Our proposal argued that, while negotiation and grimacing between res-
taurant patrons is not a good solution to the problem, strong incentives motivate 
owners to manage the place so as to accommodate, mitigate, and balance the in-
terests of smokers and non-smokers.2 The airspace in question is privately owned, 
2  See Boyes and Marlow (1996), Boyes and Marlow (1997) and Dunham and Marlow (2000A). 
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and the owner has cause to manage it in such a fashion as to increase profits. As 
long as owners desire profit, it would appear reasonable that a private market in 
accommodation exists. The next logical step was to study this private market and 
see how it manages resources. 
Part of our proposal was to collect and examine data on pre-ban accommo-
dation practices of local business owners. This seemed to me an interesting ques-
tion and necessarily an important part of any cost-benefit analysis of a smoking 
ban. I thought that it was pretty hard to ignore that smoking-nonsmoking sections 
were becoming commonplace in restaurants and that such accommodation was 
virtually nonexistent 20 years previous. Another major method, though less obvi-
ous to restaurant goers, is ventilation—in principle, a non-smoker could dine in 
comfort while seated alongside a smoker provided that fans made sure that the 
fumes never came her way. Ventilation is the secret to no-flush toilets in secluded 
homes off  the sanitation grid. 
We also proposed to survey owners regarding profit changes following the 
ban. I didn’t predict that all owners would lose, and in fact, thought most would 
either be unaffected or somehow gain from a ban, since this was the first city to 
ban smoking so fully, and so it made sense to me that the city had relatively few 
smokers and thus little opposition. But, I thought that it was important to deter-
mine how many would lose, even if it was a small number, because I don’t see 
how their welfare could be unimportant. I was enthusiastic about researching the 
Coase theorem and even wrote a five-page appendix applying it to smoking bans 
in my externalities chapter. I pulled the appendix after receiving negative feedback 
from my editors following outside reviewers who found it somewhat unsavory to 
discuss smoking in this way. 
Perhaps, we should have anticipated reaction to our proposal when we pre-
sented it to the grants committee of about 7 individuals. I remember seeing quite 
a bit of apprehension on their faces as I discussed the reason for collecting infor-
mation on the pre-ban accommodation practices of owners. When I explained 
that we needed the knowledge to understand who would tend to lose or gain, they 
looked at each other uncomfortably. Their facial expressions turned especially 
unfriendly when I mentioned that owners who previously had many smoking cus-
tomers might suffer losses. We were then politely told: We already know the answers to 
these questions. All owners benefit from the ban and so it would be a complete waste of money to 
collect such data. A few days later, Bill Boyes informed me that they rejected our pro-
posal and later I heard from another colleague of rumors that the grant committee 
concluded that we did not understand the economics of  smoking bans very well. 
I was not particularly sorry about our rejection because I had other work to 
deal with. However, Bill Boyes wasn’t fazed by the rejection and quickly suggested 
that I put together a group of economics students to collect our own data without 
benefit of any grants. Cal Poly requires all students to complete a senior project and
we had no problem enlisting eight students to collect data. We simply gave them our 
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survey instruments containing a multitude of questions from our rejected proposal. 
The students administered one survey to all affected owners of restaurants and bars, 
asking about their pre-ban accommodation practices and what effects the ban would 
have on profits. The students also administered a consumer-side survey randomly to 
residents and tourists, asking about their own smoking habits, preferences, opinions, 
and experience as consumers. 
The data were interesting and provided the empirical basis for our paper “The 
Public Demand for Smoking Bans,” published in Public Choice (Boyes and Marlow 
1996). From our survey of 764 randomly chosen individuals within San Luis Obispo, 
we found that 62 percent of nonsmokers and 40 percent of smokers believed that 
smoking/nonsmoking sections were “effective” accommodation strategies. Prior to
the ban, 95 percent of nonsmokers and 31 percent of smokers requested non-smok-
ing sections of  restaurants. 
On the supply side, we found that 68 percent of owners had not received 
“many” complaints about smokers prior to the ban. 53 percent of all owners had 
been in favor of the ban prior to its passage. To the question of profits, 25% 
of owners predicted negative impacts, 17% predicted positive impacts, and 57% 
predicted no effects. As for accommodation efforts prior to the ban, 61 percent 
of all owners reported having expended resources toward reducing smoke within 
their establishments. Of those owners, 62 percent reported the implementation 
of smoking/nonsmoking sections, and 19 percent had provided smoking patios. 
Thus, the data demonstrated active efforts in accommodation, with owners as in-
termediaries. It appeared that the Coase Theorem was alive and well in explaining 
how the private market dealt with the smoking issue prior to the ban in San Luis 
Obispo. It also demonstrated that the prediction by the grants committee of no 
adverse economic impacts was clearly wrong. 
are we wrong to investigate Markets in accoMModation? 
Some economists simply dismiss out-of-hand the first-round empirical 
checks on whether there is a private market in accommodation. I offer just a few 
choice quotes here. An early dismissal is contained in a health economics textbook, 
that states:
Trying to use agreements … between people in a restaurant to de-
termine whether smoking would take place would be the height of 
absurdity, and nobody would think seriously of a full “property rights” 
approach to such a problem. The transactions costs of reaching agree-
ments would overwhelm the problem. (Phelps, 1992, 430) 
Private markets could not possibly deal with the complex bargaining issues of 
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smoking, and we can simply save a lot of time and effort by jumping ahead to smok-
ing bans. The hidden message appears to be: Researchers who investigate whether private 
markets attempt to deal with smoking preferences should simply be dismissed or ridiculed by those 
who understand that private markets must fail at this endeavor. Clearly, from the outset there 
is a bias in favor of  government intervention. 
A recent example comes during an exchange between David Henderson 
(2007) and Benjamin Alamar and Stanton Glantz (2007), which began when Hen-
derson argued that both theory and empirics in the latter’s 2004 Contemporary Eco-
nomic Policy article were illogical. Alamar and Glantz (2004) concluded that imposi-
tion of smoking bans somehow raises values of restaurants (median increase of 
16 percent) and therefore smoking bans not only exert no harm, but actually raise 
values of businesses. In response to Henderson’s (2007) argument that a private 
market deals with smoking externalities, Alamar and Glantz (2007, 292) respond: 
This assertion cannot be true. It is not possible for a restaurant 
owner to internalize the cost of second-hand smoke on the health 
of the staff or the patrons. There is no mechanism by which a 
restaurant owner can compensate a patron for any health costs re-
lated to second-hand smoke, therefore it is not possible for the 
owner to have completely internalized the costs of the externality 
imposed by the smoker. This fact is one reason that the public has 
demanded laws to make restaurants smokefree. (Alamar and Glantz 
2007, 292) 
At the end of their paper Alamar and Glantz reiterate their main result and 
add: “This result is consistent with all other literature on the subject that has not 
been funded by the tobacco industry” (2007, 293). That statement is untrue— 
Boyes and Marlow (1996) was not funded at all, and, really, happened against long 
odds. But even if it is nearly true, perhaps it tells us about the unwillingness of 
parties other than the tobacco industry to fund research that might come to politi-
cally incorrect conclusions. 
Why not further examine data on accommodation? But data is hard to lo-
cate or acquire or gather. I recommend that interested readers conduct an Internet 
search themselves and see how much data are available on accommodation. Best I 
can tell, no one else has ever gathered such data. What are abundant, however, are 
numerous web pages describing how smoking bans exert no harm on businesses 
because there are so many studies that prove that conclusion. A much cited litera-
ture review, coauthored by Glantz, reports: 
All of the studies concluding a negative impact were supported by 
the tobacco industry. 94% of the tobacco industry supported stud-
ies concluded a negative economic impact compared to none of 
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the non-industry supported studies… All of the best designed studies 
report no impact or a positive impact of smoke-free restaurant and bar laws 
on sales or employment. Policymakers can act to protect workers and patrons 
from the toxins in secondhand smoke confident in rejecting industry claims that 
there will be an adverse economic impact. (Scollo, Lal, Hyland, and Glantz 
2003, 13; italics added) 
Why are there never any studies showing how poorly the private market 
works? The dominant belief must be that the issue is so well settled that no dis-
cussion is necessary, other than to tell readers that any research to the contrary is 
wrong and is somehow connected to the tobacco industry. Perhaps, not surprising, 
these other studies never seem to mention the few studies that address this issue.3 
John dunhaM, chief doMestic econoMist of philip Morris 
ManageMent corporation 
I thought my work on the topic ended with my Public Choice paper with 
Boyes. About a year after completing the paper, John Dunham, who at the time 
was the chief domestic economist of the Philip Morris Management Corporation, 
contacted me about extending the work. I had never received a corporate grant 
before, and had never heard of John Dunham. But I was happy to receive fund-
ing on an issue that I thought was interesting and neglected. Dunham had heard 
about my work on smoking bans from Bill Orzechowski, who was then the chief 
economist for the now defunct Tobacco Institute. Bill and I knew each other from 
my days in Washington, DC when he was at the US Chamber of Commerce and 
we had co-authored several papers on tax issues unrelated to tobacco issues. I was 
also pleased that my work was considered valuable by Phillip Morris Corporation, 
certainly a very large business, and perhaps because as a business school professor 
I had many times heard the adage, “those who can, do; those who cannot, teach.”4 
My relationship with Dunham continued for several years in which we 
worked together on a number of projects from which we published four papers 
on the subject of smoking bans—in Economic Inquiry (2000), Contemporary Economic 
Policy (2000), Applied Economics (2003), and Eastern Economic Journal (2004)—four 
established, refereed economics journals, three of which are in the Social Sciences 
Citation Index. 
The point is that my numerous professional works—with Boyes, with Dun-
ham, and other sole-authored work (see reference list)—are very often simply 
3 Research considering whether private markets accommodate smoking preferences has been both 

infrequent and unempirical; e.g., Thompson, Frost and Plaskett (1990), Lee (1991) and Tollison and 

Wagner (1992).
 
4 Woody Allen, of  course, added: “and that those who cannot teach, teach gym.”
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ignored or dismissed, despite passing peer-review muster, simply because, as 
SourceWatch confirms, Philip Morris provided funding for some of my research. 
Others who have published politically incorrect findings and ideas face similar 
problems—it’s not just in smoking research. There seems to be a tacit understand-
ing that it is OK to dismiss such politically incorrect research. 
The relationship with Dunham proved valuable to me because, not only 
does he have excellent insight into how regulations affect businesses, but his in-
stitution could fund the collection of data necessary to test hypotheses. I was also 
pleased that Dunham insisted that our research stand the test of peer-reviewed 
publication, because I would have been otherwise hesitant to pursue research ties. 
My writing was never subjected to internal censorship and always acknowledged 
the funding. 
The primary focus of my work with Dunham was to uncover the depth of 
private markets in accommodation and to test the effects of such bans on business 
owners, workers, and their customers. The studies again found an active private mar-
ket in accommodation. Here is a gloss of  the findings:5 
•	 National survey data indicate that in communities without bans owners do 
not adopt identical accommodation strategies. Some owners voluntarily ban 
all smoking and others allow smoking throughout or dedicate areas where 
smoking is not allowed. We found that nearly one-fourth allocated at least
three-fourths of their seating to non-smoking use. 
•	 Owners with fewer smoking customers allocate more resources toward 
non-smokers (more non-smoking seating, better ventilation, and other
accommodations). 
•	 Owners with more smoking customers predict losses from bans more often 
than those with few smoking customers. 
•	 Owners often adjust prices, wages, hours of operation, and other business 
attributes in response to bans, so bans also affect customers and workers. 
•	 Smoking bans are not fully enforced. Formal collection of noncompliance 
data appears to be only funded by public health and tobacco-control agencies. 
For example, the California Department of Health Services (2001) reported 
that 10 percent of bars attached to restaurants throughout California were 
noncompliant in 2001. Weber, Bagwell, Fielding and Glantz (2003) report 
a 24% noncompliance rate for freestanding bars in Los Angeles in 2002. 
Numerous newspaper articles document noncompliance across the country, 
but such frequent anecdotal evidence does not summarize easily. Common 
sense suggests that compliance is inversely related to the degree of harm 
imposed on owners. 
5 See Dunham and Marlow (2000A, 2000B, 2003, 2004). 
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•	 Bars experience more harm than restaurants because bars are more hospitable 
to patron interactions. Few bars voluntarily disallow smoking or provide 
smoking/non-smoking sections. We found that 92 percent of bar owners
allowed smoking throughout their establishments, and bar owners were more 
than twice as likely to experience losses as restaurant owners. 
•	 Because bans are mostly adopted in jurisdictions with fewer smokers,
jurisdictions that ban smoking experience less harm than would jurisdictions 
that had more smokers. 
•	 The probability that an area has a ban is positively related to the non-smoking
share of the population, so bans are endogenous and tend to be enacted after 
private markets have already been accommodating in favor of non-smokers. 
Of course, the available research does not estimate “perfection” and prove 
that private markets achieve it. But the evidence does reveal a private market 
where owners allocate resources in directions consistent with economic theory 
and therefore predicts that, as smokers dwindle in numbers, smokers will continue 
to lose ground to non-smokers. The market process evolves over time, and it is 
undoubtedly true that owners expend greater accommodation efforts now than 
in the past, simply because they pursue profits in a competitive environment in 
which consumers are more opposed to smoke. As is often the case, the social 
trend precedes the political movement. 
The next logical step is to examine how many owners are harmed by bans, 
because extent of harm is one issue that a community might consider when debat-
ing passage of  a ban. 
how to show that Bans inflict no harM 
In submitting smoking-ban research for publication at economic journals,
I’ve received roughly 10 referee reports. Not one referee or editor questioned the 
prediction that bans would exert differential effects on businesses. Readers might 
then be surprised that a fairly large empirical literature reports that bans exert no
adverse effects on owners—the public policy equivalent of showing that “water 
runs uphill.” Some empirical studies even advance arguments that bans raise profits 
so much that owners should, in effect, thank ban advocates for raising their wealth. 
A recent literature review states, “the vast majority of studies find that there is no
negative economic impact of clean indoor air policies, with many finding that there 
may be some positive effects on local businesses” (Eriksen and Chaloupka (2007,
375) I now discuss how these economic studies arrive at such conclusions. 
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ignore, denigrate, or deny private Markets in accoMModation 
A common research strategy is to simply dismiss the idea that private markets 
can manage resources efficiently. There is, of course, a problem with this logic be-
cause governments, too, are imperfect. Without plentiful data on accommodation, 
concluding that bans are the only or the best solution becomes rather silly. I have 
yet to see researchers who claim that bans exert no harm ever collect, examine, or 
even acknowledge such evidence. I invite the reader to explore how many times 
pro-ban advocates cite any of my publications with Boyes and with Dunham 
and debate whether such accommodations are sufficient at dealing with smoking. 
Please let me know when you find one such instance. 
Another means of denying existence of a private market is to forget that 
most economists would never claim that zero air or water pollution is a meaning-
ful goal simply because reduction comes with both costs and benefits. A smoking 
ban, however, overturns this logic since, in effect, the arguments for zero smoking 
must mean no costs are ever incurred when owners are forced to eliminate smoke. 
Lost customers or sales following a ban, or lost smoker welfare, can clearly be 
considered a cost of purity. A more informed policy might allow a finite number 
of tradable permits to be auctioned off in jurisdictions whereby owners whose 
businesses benefit the most from smoking can, at a price, have such rights over 
their property. I have never seen this method proposed by ban advocates, even 
though it directly parallels the now accepted idea of tradable emission rights. En-
tertaining the argument would, of course, acknowledge that bans might harm 
some businesses. 
An interesting twist is the strong reactions to improved ventilation. Drope, 
Bialous and Glantz (200) describe how the tobacco industry, in concert with the 
hospitality industry, “developed a network of consultants to promote ventilation 
as a ‘solution’ to secondhand smoke (SHS) in the USA” (41). These authors were 
alarmed that improved ventilation could undermine passage of bans, and, as their 
proof, these authors argue that the tobacco industry involvement must somehow 
demonstrate that ventilation does not solve any of the problem with smoke. A 
more useful approach might focus on how well ventilation works and whether 
there are sufficient incentives for private firms to invest and innovate in improved 
ventilation. But, again, this study would have to acknowledge existence of a pri-
vate market in accommodation. 
eMploy the “coMMunity effects” Methodology, and don’t reveal 
its shortcoMings 
Do researchers claiming that bans exert no harm investigate how many 
firms gain, lose, or are unaffected? Not really. Most studies employ a “community 
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effects” methodology that aggregates all businesses into one number and then 
examines whether this aggregate changes following a ban. The examination be-
comes: Do aggregate sales or tax revenues rise, fall, or stay the same following a ban? Studies 
routinely conclude that sales and tax revenues never fall, but rise or stay the same. 
The “community effects” method is like comparing over a ten year period how 
the average weight of 50 students has changed, and after observing that the average 
weight started 160 pounds and remained 160 pounds ten years later, concluding that 
no changes occurred over the period. Meanwhile, some students gained 20 pounds,
some lost 10 pounds, and still others exhibited no change. Maybe there’s a defense 
of the “community effects” approach, but I have never seen one, because these 
studies never address the basic criticism. 
A recent example is the paper by Eriksen and Chaloupka (2007). In the ab-
stract to “The Economic Impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws,” published in CA: A 
Cancer Journal for Clinicians, they write: 
The vast majority of scientific evidence indicates that there is no 
negative economic impact of clean indoor air policies, with many 
studies finding that there may be some positive effects on local 
businesses. This is despite the fact that tobacco industry-sponsored 
research has attempted to create fears to the contrary. Further prog-
ress in the diffusion of clean indoor air laws will depend on the 
continued documentation of the economic impact of clean indoor 
air laws, particularly within the hospitality industry. This article 
reviews the spread of clean indoor air laws, the effect on public 
health, and the scientific evidence of the economic impact of clean 
indoor air laws. (367) 
These experts appear rather convinced. But, again, most of the studies supporting 
their position employ the “community effects” approach and this fact is not dis-
cussed. No references to my studies with Boyes or Dunham are contained within 
their extensive survey of the literature. The authors are also apparently content to 
repeat the mantra that tobacco-industry funding is the reason for why any studies 
might contradict their conclusions. 
There are possible defenses for the “community effects” approach, but they 
never seem to merit discussion. One possibility is that smoking bans might help 
solve a collective action problem of owners. Suppose, for instance, that, although 
a general ban might raise revenues of all owners, cartel-like cheating undermines 
this result. The fact that firms are tempted to cheat and be noncompliant does 
not demonstrate that the ban isn't in their collective interest. It merely means that 
individual owners can do even better for themselves by having a general ban and 
then cheating unilaterally. Of course, if everyone cheats, there is no gain. The dif-
ficult trick then would be to conduct “community effects” studies only in those 
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communities where no cheating occurs. 
It also might make sense to look at “community effects” when some own-
ers lose because, even if individual firms do suffer, they might in principle be 
compensated by those who gain. There are, of course, well-known problems with 
"potential compensation” versus “actual compensation”, but this approach is com-
mon in welfare economics and might merit discussion by advocates of bans. En-
tertaining the argument would, of course, acknowledge that bans might harm some
businesses. 
disMiss all contrary research as Biased or even deceitful, 
especially when funded By the toBacco industry 
A prime example of this strategy is Scollo, Lal, Hyland and Glantz (2003) 
which reviews 97 studies on the economic effects of smoking bans on restaurants 
and bars. This widely-cited study concludes that, while roughly one third of all 
studies indicate that bans impose some harm, they are all seriously flawed. The 
authors point out that 94% of studies showing harm are somehow associated with 
tobacco industry support and they don’t appear to have any reservations about 
leaving readers with the thinly-veiled assumption that any association with the 
tobacco industry explains conclusions counter to their thesis that bans exert no 
harm. The fact that most other studies conclude either positive or no impact on 
businesses leads the authors to conclude: “Policymakers can act to protect work-
ers and patrons from toxins in second-hand smoke confident in rejecting industry 
claims that there will be an adverse economic impact” (13).The fact that none of 
these studies received any tobacco industry support is also used to suggest that 
these conclusions are correct as well as intuitively obvious. The survey by Eriksen 
and Chaloupka (2007) is the most recent study using this tactic to explain away all 
contrary research, and cites Scollo, Lal, Hyland and Glantz (2003) as evidence. 
It would take too many pages to point out the many flaws in Scollo, Lal, 
Hyland and Glantz (2003) and others, so let me highlight a few of the major 
problems. Studies finding no economic harm never formulate how smoking bans 
might affect businesses. They never allude to private markets in accommodation, 
so such facets never enter into hypotheses. They never mention studies that find 
private market accommodation. The extent to which authors develop hypotheses 
can be summarized in the following two-part story: 
•	 Because owners cannot effectively deal with smoking, bans are necessary to 
protect patrons and workers from second-hand smoke; and 
•	 Owners don’t suffer harm because bans will draw more non-smokers into 
businesses, and, because there are more non-smokers than smokers in the 
population, businesses gain more than they lose when disgruntled smokers 
VoluMe 5, nuMber 2, May 2008 251
        
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
Michael l. Marlow 
spend less. 
Even if this two-part story is correct, these studies cannot really test the 
no-harm hypothesis because they employ the above-discussed “community ef-
fects” approach and must, by research design, ignore effects imposed on indi-
vidual owners. 
Another common strategy is to denigrate all survey data of business owners 
as “biased”. Scollo, Lal, Hyland and Glantz (2003) make the following case for 
why we should heavily discount any such data: 
Unverifiable predictions of future changes or estimates of recent 
changes in patronage or spending were deemed ‘subjective’. Sub-
jective measures included anecdotal reports and self report data 
collected in polls of, or interviews with, patrons or owners of res-
taurants, bars or similar businesses, conducted either before or after 
the policy was put in place. (14) 
Would owners not be the best judge of whether bans hurt their business? 
Apparently owners’ reports must be systematically biased. Invariably one finds 
insinuations about survey-based data collection and the tobacco industry, provid-
ing readers a reason to suspect that data collected on individual owners are biased 
and misleading. That such data are essential to examining differential effects on 
owners is never mentioned. Ban advocates repeat the “bias” argument over and 
over, since otherwise they might have to reveal to readers that something other 
than a “community effects” analysis might provide a better understanding of how 
bans affect owners.6 
what aBout sMokers? 
In economics we discuss efficiency in terms of both producers and con-
sumers, but this norm is not followed in research on smoking bans. Do smokers 
not deserve to be included in our welfare analysis? While non-smokers are clearly 
a majority of the population, and growing,7 there are still many smokers left out 
of the analysis. Ignoring smokers is an easy way of ignoring costs imposed by the 
bans. Pro-ban researchers simply ignore the elimination of blocks of consumer 
6 Even if we accept the “community effect” method, Dunham and Marlow (2000B) argue that past 
applications of this method do not really demonstrate no harm. Problems include: “cherry picking” of 
data, imperfect enforcement of bans, examinations based on revenues and not profits, and the error of 
concluding that bans don’t harm when sales rise following bans when, in fact, bans exert harm when they 
cause sales to rise at a slower rate than otherwise would have occurred. 
7 From 1990 to 2005, U.S. taxed sales per capita have fallen 38%, from 101 to 63 packs (Orzechowski 
and Walker 2006), and smoking prevalence of adults has fallen from 25.5 to 20.9 percent (Centers for 
Disease Control 2006). 
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surplus. 
The costs to smokers find various manifestations. Loss of freedom over 
smoking may foster some of the following behaviors. Smokers may eat or drink 
out less often, spend less time in areas subject to bans, congregate outside of 
banned areas to smoke, smoke outdoors more often in inclement weather, smoke 
more at home, purchase higher nicotine cigarettes so that they spend less time 
puffing to achieve preferred nicotine levels, change intensities by which they puff 
since they must now “time” their smoking differently, suffer stigmatization in their 
smoking, and perhaps behave as “closet smokers.” They may also substitute some 
or all of their cigarettes for smokeless tobacco, gum, or hard candy. The list of 
changes probably goes on and on. Some suggest that the new costs of smoking— 
higher prices, inconvenience, stigma—are a factor in growing obesity.8 
Dunham and Marlow (2003) find that affected owners alter prices, wages, 
hours of operation, and other business attributes that raise or lower welfare of 
both smoking and non-smoking patrons and workers. Evans and Farrelly (1998) 
and Farrelly et al. (2004) find that higher taxes cause smokers to raise purchases 
of cigarettes with higher tar and nicotine. Adda and Cornaglia (2006B) analyze 
compensatory behavior of smokers as evidenced by data on concentrations of 
cotinine (a metabolite of nicotine) and find that higher taxes cause smokers to ex-
tract more nicotine per cigarette. While these studies do not explicitly study effects 
of bans, it is reasonable to suppose that bans are a factor. It is widely believed that 
higher concentrations exert more harm than lower concentrations and so bans 
might exert adverse health effects on some smokers.9 
Adams and Cotti (2008) report an increase in fatal driving accidents involv-
ing alcohol following smoking bans in bars. They find evidence consistent with 
the explanation that smokers drive longer distances to get to a bar where they may 
smoke, sometimes to a bordering jurisdiction without a ban, sometimes to bars 
that still allow smoking, perhaps by non-compliance or an outdoor area. After 
departing the bar they have a longer drive, hence more alcohol-related driving 
accidents. 
Surprisingly, there are studies that fail to find that bans reduce smoking. 
Buddelmeyer and Wilkins (2005) find that smoking bans in Australia don’t signifi-
cantly lower smoking for most types of individuals. They also find a significant 
“rebellion” effect among 18-24 year old smokers because they became more likely 
to continue smoking following bans. Apparently, a “James Dean” effect on youth 
may exist whereby bans make it easier to display “anti-social” behavior. 
Non-smokers may also suffer adverse health effects if they inhale more 
second-hand smoke when they are with smokers within cars or homes. Adda and 
8 Early studies connecting smoking cessation with weight gain are Williamson et al. (1991) and Flegal 
et al. (1995). Regal (2007) argues that, if smoking prevalence in 1999-2002 were at the higher 1971-1975 
smoking level, estimated 1999-2002 obesity prevalence in 1999-2003 would be 22.5% rather than the 
actual value of  23.9%. 
9 See Thun et al. (1997) for a discussion of  these adverse effects. 
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Cornaglia (2006A) examine effects of bans on passive smoking through analyzing 
cotinine concentrations on a large sample of non-smokers over time. While they 
found that bans exert on average no effects on non-smokers, bans in recreational 
public places perversely increase some non-smokers exposure by displacing smok-
ers to private places.
Adam Smith famously said that in the chessboard of human society each 
piece has principles of motion all its own. We do not—and cannot—know how 
the human chess-pieces react. The point is that acknowledgement of such factors, 
arising from imposed costs, are commonly left out. Advocates of bans typically 
represent the “man of system” attitude that presupposes inert “chess pieces”— 
exactly the mentality Smith was challenging (Smith 1790, 233-34). 
Moreover, there are also reasons to believe that we do not fully understand 
health consequences associated with second-hand smoke. My point is simply that 
statements like “Policymakers can act to protect workers and patrons from the toxins in 
secondhand smoke confident in rejecting industry claims that there will be an adverse economic 
impact” (Scollo, Lal, Hyland and Glantz 2003, 13; italics added) are irresponsible. 
Men of systeM 
In the late 1990s I attended a session at the Western Economic Association
meetings organized by a well-known public health economist who had invited 3 pa-
pers on the economics of tobacco control by researchers who had all received vari-
ous public health grants. One of the papers concluded that smoking bans were ideal 
policies because they protected non-smokers from toxins in second-hand smoke.
During the question period, I did something quite out of the ordinary for me. I 
asked: “Are you concerned that bans might raise the intensity of puffing by smokers which, if true, 
might cause them additional harm?” The presenter spent about 4 seconds on my question 
with a response something like: “I don’t really understand why this is a problem.” For some
reason, I persisted and after about the third time, I rephrased the question as simply: 
“So, if smokers want to smoke in this manner and worsen their health, this is not really our concern 
because it’s really about protecting non-smokers?” The presenter replied quickly with some-
thing like: “That is correct,” and interestingly, neither he, nor any those on the panel or
in the audience, seemed to have any problem with his response. 
If your gang simply points to smokers and claims “they are the source of the 
problem,” it might be easy to convince yourself that government should impose 
taxes or regulations on them. But—particularly in spaces customarily arranged to 
host and accommodate smoking—smokers might feel that non-smokers or busy-
bodies are the problem, in which case they might just as well want their behavior 
corrected—that is, to butt out. Pro-ban advocates ignore Coase’s insights and, 
along the way, reveal that they do not really care about harm to the minority or 
business owners that cater to them. 
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towards an unBiased treatMent of Biases 
My reflections bring us into issues of systemic bias in the way research is 
initiated, formulated, funded, validated, and received—biases not merely in the 
reasoning of any particular work, but in the cultural structures and processes with-
in which the work comes into being. It’s plain to me that deep problems exist, so 
the deep biases need to be diagnosed. The trouble is: How does one assure that 
the diagnosis of biases isn’t biased? And if I offer such assurances, how about 
assurances that the assurances of unbiased diagnosis of biases are not biased? 
Subscripts, anyone? 
are non-sMoking researchers Biased? 
Although few academics might admit biases based upon political affiliation, 
many recent studies suggest how little diversity exists among professors in the 
social sciences, humanities, social welfare, and health fields.10 Although a Gallup 
poll found Republicans more likely than Democrats to support smoking bans 
in restaurants, hotels and the workplace, the same poll indicates that supporters 
mostly rally around one characteristic: whether or not they smoke.11 This result is 
consistent with what Boyes and I found in our study of the smoking ban in San 
Luis Obispo. It is also well known that smoking prevalence falls with education.12 
Highly-educated researchers are therefore unlikely to smoke and, as a result, may 
also strongly support bans on others smoking in public. 
Biases attendant to non-toBacco industry funding of research 
What are the funding sources other than the tobacco industry? It doesn’t 
take long to recognize the variety and frequency of acknowledgements that au-
thors make regarding their financial support. The National Cancer Institute and 
National Institute of Health are commonly thanked, as are public health groups 
such as the National Heart Association, Americans for Non-Smokers Rights, and 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute. Of course, many funding dollars are also granted by 
10 For example, the fields of biology, health, and social welfare are very lopsided, medicine and nursing 
less extreme so but also preponderantly Democratic. See Gross and Simmons (2007, 34) and (Cardiff 
and Klein 2005, 247); on the Democratic tent being relatively narrow, see Klein and Stern (2005; 271-
273); on the economics profession in particular, and its paucity of free-market supporters, see Klein and 
Stern (2007). 
11 Levels of  support were: Republicans (62%) and Democrats (53%); see Moore (2005). 
12 National Center for Health Statistics (2006) reports the following prevalence rates in 2004 broken 
down by education for those aged 25 and above: 29% (less than high school), 26% (high school graduate), 
21% (some college, no degree) and 10% (bachelor’s degree and above). 
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the many schools of  medicine, government, and public health.13 
The review of over 90 studies by Scollo, Lal, Hyland and Glantz (2003) ac-
knowledges the following support: 
The VicHealth Centre for Tobacco Control is funded by the Victorian 
Health Promotion Foundation to conduct economic, legal, and social research 
in tobacco control. Dr Hyland’s work was supported by the Roswell Park Cancer 
Institute NCI-funded Cancer Center Support Grant, CA16056-26 as a member 
of the Biomathematics/Biostatistics Core Resource. Dr Glantz’s work was sup-
ported by US National Cancer Institute grant CA-6102. (18) 
Eriksen and Chaloupka (2007) acknowledge support of the Georgia Cancer 
Coalition and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s ImpacTeen project. What 
about those groups? Maybe they are biased against researchers willing to arrive 
at politically incorrect conclusions? Take a look at the websites of the Georgia 
Cancer Coalition (like here) or the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (like here) 
and decide for yourself. 
State tobacco control agencies also fund much research, and often direct-
ly via taxes on smokers.14 “Tobacco control programs” fund school programs, 
enforcement of smoking bans and age limits, counter-marketing, cessation pro-
grams, and studies that demonstrate program effectiveness. Funding appears to 
go not only to studies demonstrating program effectiveness, but studies showing 
only benefits from such programs, and that such programs should be expanded.15 
From 1994 thru 2005, Massachusetts state government spent slightly over $400 
million ($2003) on tobacco control,16 and California from 1988 thru 2006 spent 
over $2 billion ($2003).17 We do not have a breakdown that tells us how much went 
specifically to fund research. 
Finally, what about funds from pharmaceutical firms interested in market-
ing nicotine replacement therapies? It is likely that some researchers are funded 
directly by these private firms, or at least indirectly, when such firms contribute 
to various lobbies, universities, or public health groups to support their products. 
Bans may well enhance their markets. These firms may also be interested in selling 
13 The website of Tobacco Control lists the ten Tobacco Control articles that received the most downloading 
during 2007 (the articles were published between 2002 and 2006). The ten articles contain acknowledge-
ments to 12 instances of funding support: Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Roswell Park Cancer 
Institute, National Cancer Institute (6 times; some papers listed multiple NCI grants), Flight Attendants 
Medical Research Institute, Health Canada/Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Australian National 
Health and Medical Research Council and the US National Institutes of Health. As for the authors of 
the articles, most were employed at universities and most department or school affiliations contained the 
words health, pharmacy or medicine. Other places of employment were National Health Screening Ser-
vice (Norway), Norwegian Institute of Public Health, the Roswell Park Cancer Institute, Massachusetts 

Tobacco Control Program, World Health Organization and Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 

and Development. 

14 See Marlow (2006).
 
15 See Marlow (2006).
 
16 See Koh et. al. (2005)
 
17 See Marlow (2007).
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their products to public health agencies that then dispense them to smokers. Stud-
ies may also promote acceptance of their therapies by private and public health in-
surers. Little concern of bias is ever expressed. Perhaps, this industry gets a “pass” 
in the bias debate because it is on the right side of  the smoking issue. 
In an important article, “Warning: Anti-Tobacco Activism May be Hazard-
ous to Epidemiologic Science,” published in 2007 in Epidemiologic Perspectives & In-
novations, Carl Phillips argues that much funding for anti-tobacco researchers does 
come with many strings attached: 
[M]uch of the funding from anti-tobacco organizations, both gov-
ernment and private, comes with major strings attached, often all 
but declaring what the conclusions of the research should be … 
Hardly a word is heard from that quarter about the pharmaceutical 
industry or others who have a financial interest in tobacco use or 
cessation methods, and who help fund the anti-tobacco organiza-
tions. Rather, those organizations are intent on making sure that 
they get to control the funding, and thus the agenda, in “their” area, 
and the only significant threat to this monopoly is tobacco industry 
funding. For example, despite the fact that anti-tobacco organiza-
tions’ funds dwarf tobacco industry grants to academic researchers, 
no major research effort in tobacco harm reduction has been able 
to get fundamental funding without seeking it from the industry. 
(Phillips 2007, 12) 
This view is consistent with a public choice view of the world.18 The inter-
relations of government and academic institutions create a kind of centripetal 
groupthink, which allows the “right” private corporate sources of funding onto 
the team. Information and agenda control come from monopoly over funding 
and probably go a long way toward explaining the multitude of studies that claim 
that bans cause no harm. Consistent with this thesis is the fact that efforts have 
recently been made to forbid researchers at universities from receiving any fund-
ing from the tobacco industry.19 
18 Tullock (1966) attributes many of these problems to the presence of a single buyer for research 
output. In this case, various government agencies and public health non-profits might be operating as a 
loose cartel whereby they determine the parameters of “acceptable” science and help orchestrate attacks 
on opposing research. 
19 Blumenstyk (2007) discusses how various universities, such as public health schools at Johns Hopkins 
University and Harvard University, have banned researchers from accepting tobacco-industry money for 
research. Recently, the University of California had considered such a ban, but instead adopted a less-
stringent policy whereby researchers may only accept such money following approval by a special scien-
tific committee that verifies that any proposed study "uses sound methodology and appears designed to 
allow the researcher to reach objective and scientifically valid conclusions." 
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the file drawer 
If studies failing to show one’s preferred hypothesis tend to be deposited 
in “file drawers,” then published studies will be biased toward showing support 
for preferred hypotheses. Reporting biases have been discussed for many years. 
Leamer’s (1983) paper “Let’s Take the Con out Of Econometrics” describes the 
many biases that arise when researchers fail to report the many tests that they have 
conducted. Reporting a subset of all empirical runs conducted over the course of 
research promotes overconfidence in published results that are probably facili-
tated with rapid declines in computing costs and greater data availability. Ioannidis 
(2005) goes so far as to claim: “Simulations show that for most study designs and 
settings, it is more likely for a research claim to be false than true. Moreover, for 
many current scientific fields, claimed research findings may often be simply ac-
curate measures of  the prevailing bias” (124). 
Even if researchers were indifferent to whether smoking bans impose costs, 
journal editors and reviewers would promote the file drawer effect when they 
strongly preferred one hypothesis over another. There appears great potential for 
this bias given that there is one journal that exists solely for the purpose of pub-
lishing papers on controlling tobacco. Tobacco Control bills itself as “An internation-
al peer review journal for health professionals and others in tobacco control” and 
is published by the BMJ Group which is a global medical publishing organization 
and a wholly owned subsidiary of the British Medical Association.20 It shouldn’t 
take readers long before they realize that the vast majority of papers published in 
Tobacco Control conclude that tobacco control measures are very effective. Many 
of the no-harm papers cited in the literature review by Scollo, Lal, Hyland and 
Glantz (2003) were published in Tobacco Control. And the Scollo, Lal, Hyland and 
Glantz (2003) review itself is published in Tobacco Control. Similar observations 
can be made for other public health journals such as the American Journal of Public 
Health and the Journal of the American Medical Association. Rarely do papers published 
in these and other journals conclude that government interventions do not ef-
fectively mitigate one problem or another. One might wonder how full the “file 
drawers” have become. 
“good intentions” Bias 
Smoking bans are often promoted on the basis of good intentions: we are 
doing this to protect non-smoking patrons and employees; we are doing this for the health of chil-
dren; we are doing this to protect addicted or uninformed smokers who cannot help themselves; we 
are doing this because owners do not understand that bans are good for them; and so on. 
The following quotation is the abstract of a 31-page Journal of Economic Sur-
20 See Tobacco Control’s website: http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com. 
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veys literature survey of  tobacco-control studies: 
This survey focuses on government efforts to curb the use of un-
desirable goods, notably tobacco products. We synthesize the eco-
nomics literature and examine the effectiveness of government 
curbs on tobacco consumption through non-price controls (such 
as bans on cigarette advertising, health warnings, and workplace 
smoking bans) and price measures (or higher prices through higher 
taxes). This literature review is unique in that we do not merely aim 
to provide a summary of the literature. Rather, our main focus is 
to draw conclusions from the literature regarding the effectiveness 
of alternate policy measures across countries in checking smok-
ing and to provide directions/suggestions for extending the scope 
of government intervention to other tobacco products. (Goel and 
Nelson 2006, 325) 
The survey contains 103 separate references and never addresses the fun-
damental issue of why it is that we need these anti-smoking remedies or how they 
know that private markets fail to effectively deal with smoking. The authors ap-
pear to have no reservations about pursuing interventions as long as they correct 
“undesirable” behaviors such as smoking. As the authors say, their purpose is to 
“provide directions/suggestions for extending the scope of government interven-
tion to other tobacco products.” 
There may be a bias toward not going much farther than “good intentions,” 
especially among a reference group consisting mostly of people who do not smoke, 
do not own a business, and romanticize the ability of governments to improve 
society. So, it might be pretty easy to persuade many that bans don’t impose costs. 
It’s also likely that many of us would prefer to never experience smoking again. 
These biases probably predispose many of us to not scrutinize evidence claiming 
that bans yield benefits with no harm. 
second-hand sMoke: suspect science 
The following recent quotation summarizes the view that second-hand 
smoke isn’t a major health problem. 
While there is ample evidence that chronic exposure to secondhand 
smoke increases the risk of cardiovascular disease, and therefore 
heart attack risk, and there is some suggestive evidence that acute 
exposure to secondhand smoke may present some danger of risk 
to individuals with existing severe coronary artery disease, there ap-
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pears to be no scientific basis for claims that brief, acute, transient 
exposure to secondhand smoke increases heart attack risk in indi-
viduals without coronary disease, that it increases such risk to the 
level observed in smokers, that it can cause atherosclerosis, that it 
can cause fatal or catastrophic cardiac arrhythmias, or that it rep-
resents any other significant acute cardiovascular health hazard in 
nonsmokers. (Siegel 2007, 24) 
This summary comes from a paper entitled “Is the Tobacco Control Move-
ment Misrepresenting the Acute Cardiovascular Health Effects of Secondhand 
Smoke Exposure?” in Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations in 2007. The author, 
Michael Siegel, is Professor of Social & Behavioral Sciences at Boston University’s 
School of Public Health and, on his own website, he writes of himself: “He has 
been active in promoting smoke-free bar and restaurant policies throughout the 
country and has served as an expert witness in several major tobacco litigation 
cases.”21 
Siegel’s (2007) paper discusses what he refers to as wild claims regarding 
adverse health effects of second-hand smoke of many pro-ban advocates and 
discusses how he has been personally attacked for criticizing such claims. 
The general approach has been to attack ad hominem, rather than to 
directly confront the arguments being made. For this reason, I have 
come to the impression that the tobacco control movement does 
not allow room for any difference of opinion, and that those who 
dissent with any aspect of  the prevailing wisdom must be discredit-
ed, attacked and silenced. I sense a rather McCarthyistic element in 
the tobacco control movement. Whether the scientific arguments I 
have made are valid or not is up for question and debate; the unwill-
ingness of the movement to be willing to entertain a discussion of 
the validity of its scientific claims, on the other hand, is a dangerous 
element in a public health movement. (Siegel 2007, 20) 
The claims that Siegel is referring to are contained in his blog tobaccoanaly-
sis.blogspot.com and interested readers might be rather surprised at the degree to 
which Siegel describes the “junking” of epidemiology. In brief, Siegel (2007) has 
been vehemently attacked for criticizing views of leading anti-tobacco activists 
on the extent of health risks to non-smokers. Siegel fears: “The dissemination of 
inaccurate information by anti-smoking groups to the public in support of smok-
ing bans is unfortunate because it may harm the tobacco control movement by 
undermining its credibility, reputation, and effectiveness” (24). 
A rather public fight is ongoing between Siegel and Stanton Glantz, with 
21 The webpage containing the quotation is here. 
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the latter one of the leaders of the tobacco control movement and co-author of 
papers quoted here several times. As quoted in a recent Boston Globe article, Glantz 
states the following about Siegel: 
I view him as a tragic figure—he has completely lost it. His view 
is that everybody in the tobacco control movement is corrupt and 
misguided except for him. You have to be careful what you say to 
preserve credibility in academic circles, and he is not doing that. 
(Glantz qtd. in Beam 2007) 
Carl Phillips, an epidemiologist at the University of Alberta, has also written 
about personal and financial attacks leveled against him, as he, too, has been vocal 
about what he perceives as junk science in the study of environmental tobacco 
smoke (ETS): 
There is little doubt that inhaling smoke in unhealthy, but equally 
clear evidence shows that we can only demonstrate disease risk 
from ETS for those at the highest level of exposure. The evidence 
about health effects of smoke and the legitimate aesthetic objection 
to involuntary ETS exposure are quite sufficient to justify prohibit-
ing indoor smoking in public places, though clearly insufficient to 
justify public policies that prohibit voluntary low-level ETS gain. 
The activists involved, many of whom hold titles that indicate that 
they should behave as scientists and academics, appear unconcerned 
about subverting science to further their worldly agendas, hurting 
the careers of honest scientists, driving students away from politi-
cally controversial fields, attacking the principles of free academic 
research, and threatening the reputation of epidemiology as a field. 
(Phillips 2007, 7) 
UCLA medical researcher James E. Enstrom also writes of extensive per-
sonal attacks following publication of his 2003 British Medical Journal paper that 
found little relationship between ETS and tobacco-related mortality. Enstrom 
(2007) documents his many claims that anti-tobacco activists have not properly 
presented evidence on effects of second-hand smoke and at times have also mis-
represented evidence. The paper compares “current ETS epidemiology in the U.S. 
with pseudoscience in the Soviet Union during the period of Trofin Devisovich 
Lysensko” (2). Enstrom highlights Stanton Glantz as a major source of  attacks. 
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intiMidation as a strategy 
Intimidation appears to be part of the strategy used against those who do 
not fully support anti-tobacco activists. In the Internet age it is pretty easy to 
learn about the lives of researchers. Recent inspection of SourceWatch’s entry for 
UCLA epidemiologist Enstrom, just mentioned, reveals the following summary: 
Enstrom is a controversial figure who has accepted funding from 
the Philip Morris tobacco company and the Center for Indoor Air 
Research (a tobacco industry front group), and subsequently pub-
lished research that contradicted scientific consensus about the 
health effects of secondhand tobacco smoke … (SourceWatch, 
link) 
I recently read a paper published in a prestigious economics journal to re-
main nameless that called into question some of the claims of tobacco control 
activists. I enjoyed the paper and sent a quick email to one of the authors stating 
that I thought they had done a good job and sent along a suggestion where they 
might extend their research. Within a few hours I received an email back from one 
of the authors, but clearly the email was not intended for me to see. In it, one of 
the two authors wrote to the other author that “I don’t think we should get involved 
with this guy because I hear he has very deep connections with Phillip Morris.” I figured out 
pretty quickly that the email was supposed to be for their eyes only, but, by mis-
take, was sent to me as well. I had no doubts that they had located my listing under 
SourceWatch. I immediately sent the authors a reply email that simply read some-
thing like: “Thanks for the quick reply and I appreciate your honesty,” to which I received 
another email from one of the authors within a few minutes that read something 
like: “I am very sorry for that, I hit the wrong button on my email program. We have to be very 
cautious about our work as we experienced very strong personal attacks to this paper we just 
published.” I ended the exchange with something like: “Welcome to the club, I am not 
surprised, and best of  luck.”
One more personal story appears appropriate. I have recently been pub-
lishing articles in peer-reviewed journals that question the influence of tobacco-
control spending on cigarette consumption and smoking prevalence.22 I have not 
received grants of any kind for this research from any tobacco-related entity. In 
fact, my grants from the tobacco industry ended quite awhile back, when I fin-
ished my work on smoking bans. Fortunately, I have been able to obtain data on 
tobacco-control programs from the Internet and, unlike smoking bans, lack of 
funding is not much of an obstacle to this research effort. My research finds that 
public spending exerts little effect on smoking consumption and prevalence, de-
spite continual statements by anti-tobacco activists that spending not only signifi-
22 Marlow (2006), Marlow (2007), Marlow (2008A) and Marlow (2008B). 
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cantly lowers smoking, but programs are critically under-funded. I am sure these 
conclusions are not well received by anti-tobacco activists, even though I would 
have thought they would be interested in re-allocating funding in ways that might 
reach their objectives of  eliminating smoking. 
One of these papers, which I will not name, was accepted for publication 
after going through a fairly lengthy review period in which I made many good 
changes to the paper. A few weeks after its acceptance, I received an email from 
the editor of the journal stating that he had received word from someone that my 
paper did not acknowledge the fact that I was someone with strong ties to the 
tobacco industry and that it was unethical to not disclose this conflict to read-
ers. Again, the source was probably SourceWatch’s faulty information. The editor 
asked if this was true. I replied that, although I had received grants in the past for 
work on smoking bans, that I had not received any funding for this or related work 
on tobacco-control spending. I then added that I wasn’t really keen on adding a 
disclosure that read that “I had received grants in the past from the tobacco industry, but 
not for this paper”. The editor agreed, and to his credit, said he was satisfied with my 
response and that no further action was necessary. 
who would fund such research? 
I have suggested that tobacco firms have aimed their funding toward re-
search that focuses on how private markets work, while non-tobacco funding 
sources aim their funding toward research that shows that government interven-
tion is effective. Further, I have suggested that ideological sensibilities differ be-
tween these two different research paths, and that still other biases might be in play. 
However, I doubt that the two opposing predispositions regarding the proper role 
of government somehow balance out. In the smoking ban literature, it is clear that 
there are many more studies showing that smoking bans inflict no harm on any 
business and, as it turns out, most of these studies are funded by dollars outside 
of  the tobacco industry. 
We should address the following question: Who else would fund studies 
that seriously examine how private establishments manage diverse preferences 
regarding smoking? Pro-ban researchers never collect such data nor give much 
consideration to private market efforts. Given the pervasive factors—the costly 
nature of data acquisition, the paucity of free-market researchers, the preponder-
ance of non-smokers, the seductions of “good intentions,” and the many fund-
ing sources available to those who prefer government intervention—very little 
research on private markets is conducted. If not funded by industries adversely 
affected by such intervention or think tanks interested in free markets, even less 
research would be conducted. Moreover, given the apparent scarcity of journals 
that have editors, officers, and referees interested in uncovering how well private 
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markets manage resources, it’s not particularly surprising that little research on 
private markets is conducted. I can just imagine how my proposals for conducting 
smoking-ban studies would have been received if I had submitted them to the 
many funding sources available to anti-tobacco activists. 
An interesting view is expressed in Phillips (2007) regarding the strings at-
tached to research funding: 
Anti-Tobacco activists have long coasted on the cigarette industry’s 
misdeeds regarding producing illegitimate research. The substantial 
and deplorable misdeeds from thirty or forty years ago are well doc-
umented, and it is clear that the industry has been guilty of many 
of the same crimes against epidemiology practiced by anti-tobacco 
activists today: One result of that guilt coming to light is that claims 
by the industry are widely discounted, making them little present 
threat to honest science. Despite this, anti-tobacco activists are still 
trying to attribute epidemiology that they do not like to the (largely 
nonexistent) influence of the industry in the field. Another result 
of the guilt is that the industry’s every move is carefully watched, 
making tobacco industry funding a professor’s dream: the funder 
does not dare say a word to try to influence the research. (Phillips 
2007, 12) 
This account certainly accords with my own experience. No one was look-
ing over our shoulders, or attempting to manipulate our research. The overriding 
issue was to publish peer-reviewed work and gain credibility. But, as discussed 
many times in this article, activists have not shied away from claiming that all re-
search connected in any way to the tobacco industry must be incorrect and even 
deceitful. Thus far, this strategy has largely been effective in protecting them from 
coming to terms with opposing research. 
All studies, whether sponsored by private or public monies, deserve scrutiny 
and a degree of skepticism. But the more central ethical principle of scholarly 
discourse should be, rather, what Wayne Booth (1974) calls “the rhetoric of as-
sent,” that is, an initial readiness to suppose that the other guy or gal is also fair 
minded and trustworthy, and deserves being heard out. I should not dismiss stud-
ies funded by anti-tobacco sources, and others should not dismiss studies funded 
by the tobacco industry. It’s not a matter of either 100 percent trust or 100 percent 
skepticism. It is an initial inclination toward assent combined with a degree of fair 
and responsible skepticism after you’ve heard the other guy or gal out. 
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